Fuzzing Large Language Models to Elicit Hidden Behaviours

Sleeper agents are the canonical model organism of deception: models trained to behave normally but to emit an unsafe behaviour on a specific trigger. Eliciting that behaviour without knowing the trigger has not been studied systematically. We study fuzzing: injecting Gaussian noise into a model’s weights or residual-stream activations and checking whether the perturbed outputs reveal the behaviour. On 6 backdoored models (7B– 13B) we compare both forms of fuzzing head-to-head against temperature-7 sampling baselines. Fuzzing elicits the hidden behaviour more often than temperature sampling on 4 of 6 models (up to∼6× on OpenHermes-13B), and which form wins depends on the task, so both are worth running. Elicitation is uneven across each method’s hyperparameter grid: a uniform sweep gives only a few percent on most models, while the best cell is 2–10× higher, so the bottleneck is hyperparameter selection, not the technique. To select hyperparameters without ground-truth access, we use a cheap proxy task—in-context secret elicitation, where a base64-encoded secret is placed in the system prompt for the model to hide—and run Thompson sampling on it to pick candidate cells, which we evaluate on the real backdoor. On the four models that can decode the secret, proxy-selected cells raise activation-fuzzing elicitation∼4× over the uniform-sweep mean (recovering∼70% of the best-cell rate on the best performing model) and weight-fuzzing by 1.3–1.8×. To our knowledge this is the first systematic study of fuzzing on sleeper-agent backdoors and the first to show proxy- task hyperparameter selection transferring to real-task elicitation. We also propose reporting such results as a (uniform-baseline, proxy-selected, oracle) triple, since these are three distinct claims that prior work has often blurred.