Decided Upstream, Written Late: Locating and Pricing the Cross-lingual Circuit of a Multilingual MoE

Safety alignment in multilingual models is uneven: a model that reliably refuses a harmful request in English will often comply with the same request in a lower-resource language. We trace this gap mechanistically in Sarvam 30B, an Indic-multilingual mixture-of-experts reasoning model, and find it is not a failure to detect harm. Harm is encoded as an internal direction that is nearly language-invariant in mid-network (English-vs-Indic cosine ${\approx}0.9$ at $L11$), and steering that direction upstream causally controls refusal. But the detection direction is orthogonal to the change that actually writes the refusal, which is late and assembled over the course of generation rather than read off in a single forward pass. We attribute the write to a specific, localizable circuit–a mixture-of-experts writer held in check by an attention opposer–and price every way of intervening on it: damping the opposer is cheap and effective, amplifying the writer is a cost wall, and surgical edits to the responsible heads do nothing. The circuit's organization, and the gradient method that exposes it, recur in a second, unrelated MoE model, while the lever's strength is architecture-specific. The result is a cost-measured map of where a multilingual safety repair can land, and what it costs.